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Abstract
We study the problem of evaluating whether the selection from a
set is close to the ordering of the set determined by an exogenously
given measure. Our main result is that three axioms, two naturally
capturing “dominance”, and a stronger one imposing a form of sym-
metry in the comparison of selections, are sufficient to evaluate how
close any selection from any set is to the given ordering of the set.
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1 Introduction
Selections are typically made according to a varying blend of objective mea-
sures and subjective judgments. A sport coach might base her team choice
on the recent performance of individuals in her squad (batting and bowl-
ing/pitching averages, tennis rankings, trial results for track and field, and
so on), and on her sense of who is the best person for each given role, given
the expected conditions. Many universities do not strictly follow SATs results
and school grades when choosing whom to admit, but take into account a
student’s social background and his potential contribution to desirable char-
acteristics of the student body, like diversity. Applicants for academic jobs
might be ranked according to bibliometric measures, but the appointment
panel’s judgment often leads to decision that do not map precisely into the
ranking.1 Large and complex procurement contracts often demand the sub-
tle evaluation of complex qualitative elements, and lowest price is seldom the
only criterion used to award these contracts.2 And so forth and so on.
Observers and decision makers might be interested in some means of
comparing the choices of different selectors. If the property of following the
measurable dimension is labelled “orderliness”, someone might want to com-
pare the orderliness of different selections, for example to determine which is
more “orderly”.
We can think of at least three conceptually distinct situations where this
1An example from recent implementation of policy which some readers will be famil-
iar with is the extent by which bibliometric criteria should be used in the evaluation of
university research departments. Unlike in Italy, the UK funding body was persuaded to
allow panels not to adhere strictly to bibliometric measures of departmental output, but
allow the latitude afforded by peer review. We reprise this theme in Section 5.
2As, for instance, the 1991 auctions for the 16 regional television franchises in the UK,
when only half the franchises were awarded to the highest bidder; see Cabizza and De
Fraja (1998), especially Table 1, pp 11-12.
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comparison is meaningful.3 First, we may want to compare different selec-
tions from the same set. For example, the public may want to know how
close the proposed shortlists of the different judges of a book or film prize
are to a market-determined (sales, box office earnings) ordering. Second, the
comparison might be of selections from altogether different sets. A cricket
fan may want to know whether Australia’s selection for the Ashes team is
closer to the players’ current rankings than England’s. A university whose
admission policies are under scrutiny in court may want to argue that its
admission policy is as based on SATs as those of comparable institutions. Or
a government minister concerned about corruption in procurement contracts
or personnel hiring may want to compare the orderliness of various commis-
sioning boards or hiring panels, to identify and perhaps investigate atypical
behaviour. On a broader scale, orderliness is a helpful yardstick when assess-
ing inequality of opportunity: it can serve as a measure of nepotism, telling
how close selection into society’s elite is to the pecking order determined by
family history, or of plutocracy, measured for example by the closeness of
membership of Parliament to a person’s position in the income distribution.
The third kind of potential comparisons is for situations where both the se-
lection and the selectors are the same, but there are two or more ways of
ordering the elements of a set. In these cases, which are close to the topic
of some related literature considered below (Kemeny 1959, Klamler 2008),
the focus is on their relative importance in the selection. For example, a
rugby analyst may want to know whether weight or speed is more important
to be selected as a three-quarter for the Springboks. Or an external funder
may want to know which of teaching and research is more important for
3Selection is of course a broader concept than full ordering: choosing the all-time best
20 in a list of 1000 footballers is different and less demanding than naming the best 20.
The relation between selection and ordering is explored in Section 4.
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promotion in a given university.
Comparing selections is straightforward only in the starkest cases. Sure,
the selection of the best ranked is unquestionably more orderly than se-
lections that do not. But is a university which, from its 102 applicants,
admits as students those ranked according to their SAT scores second to
fifth, eighth, eleventh, twelfth, twenty-fourth, twenty-fifth, thirty-eighth, and
forty-seventh more orderly than one that chooses the first twenty, the fifty-
seventh, and those ranked between 170 and 180 out of 500 applicants? Or, in
an even simpler example, is picking the second ranked out of ten candidates
for a job more orderly than selecting the third ranked out of nineteen?4
This paper takes an axiomatic approach to comparing selections. The
axioms are requirements of orderliness: a decision maker who is called to
opine which is more orderly of two selections from different sets, that is
which selection is in her opinion closer to the order – determined by a given
measure – of the set from which it is taken, should only make judgements
that obey these axioms. This is conceptually similar to the approach taken
by Sen (1976) and Cowell and Kuga (1981) in regard to judgements on which
of two groups of individuals poverty or inequality, respectively, is greater.
We begin with three natural axioms, which extend the dominance prin-
ciple in the comparison of sets (Barbera` et al 2004, BBP in what follows).
The first requires that when an element is replaced in the selection with a
better one, then the selection is deemed to be more orderly. In the next two
axioms we depart from the set-up of the literature reviewed in BBP, and in
some of its extensions, such as Rubinstein and Salant (2006). The departure
is that we consider elements that are not in the original set, thus allowing
the comparison of selections from different sets, as in many of the examples
4According to our paper, it turns out that these four selections are equally orderly.
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given above. These axioms require that if a new element appears which is
better than all the selected (non-selected) ones, then the selection is consid-
ered more (less) orderly if the new element is selected. Analogously for the
appearance of a worse element. Extending the axioms to different sets im-
plies that we cannnot, like the literature cited, take the rank of the elements
as the starting point of the analysis, since a new elements change the ranks
of all the elements below it. Instead, we need to make formally explicit the
mapping from the measured performance to the rank of the elements ordered
by this measure.
These three axioms, which we show to be independent, are not charac-
terising: there are different orderings of selections from sets which satisfies
them. In our main result we show that characterisation is achieved by replac-
ing the first axiom with a stronger one, which we label “mirror invariance”.
This requires that if a change makes a selection more orderly, then the mirror
image of the selection – that is the selection of only the non-selected elements
– is made less orderly by the mirror image of the change. This is equivalent
to requiring that the importance attributed to changes in the ordering be
independent of where they occur: departures from the ranking are as impor-
tant if they occur among the best or the worst ranked elements. This result
is established in Theorem 1, which shows that the orderliness relation char-
acterised by Axioms 2-4 is represented, in close analogy to the representation
of a consumer’s preference by a utility function, by an “index of orderliness”,
given by a simple function of the number of elements in the set, the number
of selected elements, and the sum of the ranks of the selected elements.
The paper continues by showing that our index of orderliness has a simple
relation with the concept of distance between rankings originally proposed
by Kendall (1938), and given an axiomatic foundation by Kemeny (1959).
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This distance compares different selections from the same set, and, in this
case, Proposition 4 shows that if a selection is more orderly than another
selection from the same set, then the ranking of the set naturally induced by
the first selection is nearer, in the sense of the Kendall-Tau distance, to the
ordering of the set.
The paper is organised as follows: the dominance axioms and some pre-
liminary results are in Section 2. The core of the paper is Section 3, which
presents the index of orderliness, and strengthens one of the axioms to obtain
a complete ordering of all selected sets. The relation with existing literature
is explored in Section 4, and the paper ends with Section 5, which shows how
the index can be used to assess the evaluation mechanism for promotion to
professorship in Italian universities. A brief conclusion follows.
2 Axioms of “orderliness”
Let N  R contain N ∈ N\ {1} distinct elements: x, y ∈ N implies x 6= y.5
The inequality relation in R induces a transitive, complete and antisymmetric
relation between the members of N . This relation is naturally defined as the
rank in N , ρN , a bijective mapping of the elements of N into the set of the
first N natural numbers ρN : N −→ {1, 2, . . . , N}, which satisfies ρN (x) <
ρN (y) if and only if x < y. We choose this convention, that x has a better6
rank in N than y if it is smaller, for definiteness. It would refer for example,
to a situation where the real numbers are marathon runners’ personal best
5We therefore rule out ties between elements, consideration of which is important for
practical purposes, but not straightforward. We remark briefly in Section 5 below on
possible approaches when some elements of the set are ranked equally, otherwise we restrict
our attention to antisymmetric relations.
6We use the terminology “best” and “worst” ranked element, rather than highest and
lowest, given the potential linguistic ambiguity due to the lowest number being attached
to the highest ranked element.
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times; the changes needed to apply the framework to situations where a larger
real number is better, such as cricketers’ career runs or scientists’ citation
counts, are obvious.
We next define a selection K as a proper and non-empty subset of N , that
is K  N , and K 6= ∅. Let K ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} be the number of elements
of K. We define the pair (N ,K) a “selected set”.7 Let S be the family of
selected sets.
Given a selected set (N ,K) ∈ S , there is a natural mapping induced by
ρN from S into the set S defined as
S =
 ⋃
N∈N\{1}
(
N, 2{1,...,N}\ {1, . . . , N}
) \∅,
that is as the union, over the natural numbers greater than 1, of the cartesian
product between N and the power set of {1, . . . , N}, with the set {1, . . . , N}
itself removed. The generic element of the set S is therefore (N, {i1, . . . , iK}),
where ik ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Define this map as:
m : S −→ S,
such that for (N ,K) ∈ S , where N is a set with N elements, from which
K are selected, m (N ,K) is the pair given by the cardinality of N and the
7Selecting members of a set is related but different from the administration of a test. In
the former, the number of available places is usually fixed, or at least within a given range;
whereas the important feature of a test, such as a school leaving exam, or the rejection
of potentially faulty items from a production line, is the minimisation of errors, possibly
weighted by the relative importance of type I and type II errors. Loosely speaking, one
can think of selection according to a rank and testing as inverse operations: in the former,
the number of slots is fixed, and the distribution in the population of the metric on which
the ranks are based determines the threshold for selection; in the latter, the pass/fail
threshold is fixed, and the distribution determines the number of successful elements.
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subset of {1, . . . , N} which are the ranks in N of the elements of K:
m : (N ,K) 7−→ (N,{i ∈ {1, . . . , N} |ρ−1N (i) ∈ K}) .
Recall that, because the elements of N are different, ρN is invertible. Given
a selected set (N ,K) such that m (N ,K) = (15, {2, 3, 8, 12}), implying that
the second, the third, the eighth and the twelfth ranked out of the set’s 15
elements are selected, we may represent its image under m as follows:
(N ,K) −→ 011000010001000. (1)
Elements are ranked from best to the left, to worst to the right, and a “1”
in the j-th position indicates that the j-th element is selected.
We single out the situations where the selection follows exactly the rank-
ing.
Definition 1 Given a selected set (N ,K) ∈ S , the selection K is “ perfect”
if x ∈ K and y ∈ N \K implies x < y. The selection K is “ antiperfect”
if x ∈ K and y ∈ N \K implies y < x.
In words, the selection K is perfect if no selected element has a rank
worse than a non-selected element, and it is antiperfect if every selected
element has a worse rank than every non-selected element.
Let S P ⊆ S be the set of all perfect selections, and conversely, let
S A ⊆ S be the set of all antiperfect selections. Note that since K is a
proper non-empty subset ofN ,S P∩S A = ∅: no selection is simultaneously
both perfect and antiperfect.
We want to compare selections, that is order the set S , in the following
sense: consider two ranked sets NA with NA elements, and NB with NB
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elements, and selections KA and KB from NA and NB, respectively. We
want to answer the question: is the selection KA from NA closer to or farther
from the ranking of set NA than the selection KB from NB is to the ranking
of set NB? In terms of the examples given above, we want to know whether,
say, a journalist’s choice of the “all time England cricket test team” is more
based on the players’ record than an Italian chemistry academy’s choice of
the members of its scientific committee is based on the academics’ citation
count.
To formalise this question we define a binary relation M ⊆ S×S, which
we interpret as “orderliness”: orderliness is the property of being close to
the ordering of the set.
Definition 2 Given two selected sets (NA,KA) , (NB,KB) ∈ S , (NA,KA) is
at least as orderly as (NB,KB) if and only if
(
m (NA,KA) ,m (NB,KB)
) ∈
M.
We are thus defining equivalence classes inS : two selected sets (NA,KA) ,
(NB,KB) ∈ S are in the same equivalence class if and only if m (NA,KA) =
m (NB,KB), that is if the sets NA and NB have the same number of ele-
ments, and the ranks of the selected elements are the same in the selected sets
(NA,KA) and (NB,KB). In particular, the image of ({x1, . . . , xN} , {xi1 , . . . , xiK})
is the same as the image of any set where xj is replaced by any x in an inter-
val of the real line containing xj but no other element of {x1, . . . , xN}. Thus
Definition 2, accordingly, defines orderliness as a relation on the classes of
equivalence in S .
We follow the standard convention used to describe preferences, and write
(NA,KA) %M (NB,KB) when (NA,KA) is at least as orderly as (NB,KB).
“Strict orderliness”, M, and “equal orderliness”, ∼M, are naturally defined:
8
(NA,KA) is strictly more orderly than (NB,KB) if (NA,KA) %M (NB,KB)
and not (NB,KB) %M (NA,KA). And (NA,KA) and (NB,KB) are equally
orderly if (NA,KA) %M (NB,KB) and (NB,KB) %M (NA,KA).
We require the orderliness relation M to be reflexive, so that all selected
sets with the same image are equally orderly, complete and transitive. The
assumption of completeness is a strong one, though it is necessary to ensure
that orderliness can have operational value in practice, as it ensures that there
are no selections which are “not comparable”. Relatively simple examples
show that it is in principle arbitrary to construct such a complete ordering.
Consider two selected sets (NA,KA) , (NB,KB) ∈ S , such thatm (NA,KA) =
(35, {2, 5, 6, 7, 10, 16, 24, 28}) and m (NB,KB) = (21, {3, 6, 8, 10, 11}). These
can be represented graphically as:
(NA,KA) −→ 01001110010000010000000100010000000,
(NB,KB) −→ 001001010110000000000.
In (NA,KA), there are some selected elements among the best ranked, but
there are also some below the median. In the second, from a smaller set,
no selected element is below the median, but many are close to it: different
observers might well have different views as to which of the two above se-
lections is more orderly. As we show in this paper, this arbitrariness is fully
resolved if one accepts the simple axioms we propose.
Even with completeness, without any further restrictions, the orderliness
relation can still be vacuous: for example, the relation M = S×S, where
all selected sets are equally orderly, is transitive, reflexive and complete, and
so it can well represent a person’s opinion of the orderliness of selections. In
the rest of the paper, therefore, we impose some further requirements. As in
BBP, they are natural restrictions on M, the relation between the images in
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S of the sets (N ,K). BBP (p 904) begin by imposing the “extension rule”:
given x, y ∈ N , then m (N , {x}) %M m (N , {y}) if and only if x < y. We
strengthen the extension rule, requiring that the orderliness comparison be
strict, and that it applies to any set, not just singletons.
Axiom 1 (Swap-Dominance) For all (N ,K) ∈ S and x ∈ N\K and
y ∈ K, (N ,K∪{x} \ {y}) M (N ,K) if and only if x < y.
In words, Axiom 1 requires that the swap between an element in the selec-
tion and an element not in the selection makes the selected set strictly more
(less) orderly if the rank of the newly selected element is better (worse) than
the rank of the removed element.8 Note that Axiom 1 is incompatible with
the independence axiom (BBP p 905), which, in our framework, would re-
quire that, given selections (N ,KA) , (N ,KB) ∈ S and x ∈ N\ (KA ∪ KB),
(N ,KA) M (N ,KB) implies (N ,KA ∪ {x}) %M (N ,KB ∪ {x}). As BPP
note, this axiom rules out “certain types of complementarities” (p 906), and
runs therefore contrary to the motivation of the paper, which views selections
in their entirety. In fact, BBP show that independence is a strong require-
ment in this context, as it prevents comparison between selections, except in
very special cases (BBP, pp 910-922).
The next two Axioms we impose are the natural extension of the idea of
dominance, which “requires that adding an element which is better (worse)
than all elements in a given set A [...] leads to a set that is better (worse)
than the original set” (BBP, p 905). In our more complex set-up, we want
to compare subsets selected from different sets, and therefore we state the
axioms as binary comparisons between sets with different number of elements.
8One could make an analogy with the Dalton-Pigou principle (Dalton 1920, p 351);
a transfer of a resource (being selected in our case, or income in Dalton’s) from a worse
ranked/richer to a better ranked/poorer element/person, so long as that transfer does not
reverse the ranking of the two, will result in greater orderliness/equity.
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Axiom 2 (Better-Dominance) For all (N ,K) ∈ S and x /∈ N such
that x < y for all y ∈ K:
i. (N∪{x} ,K∪{x}) %M (N ,K); strictly unless (N ,K) ∈ S P .
ii. (N ,K) %M (N∪{x} ,K); strictly unless (N ,K) ∈ S A.
Suppose a new element is added9 to the set N , and this new element has
better rank than every selected element. Then Axiom 2 requires that, if this
new element is selected, the selection becomes more orderly (Axiom 2.i); if
it is not selected, the selection becomes less orderly (Axiom 2.ii).
Axiom 3 (Worse-Dominance) For all (N ,K) ∈ S and x /∈ N such that
y < x for all y ∈ K:
i. (N∪{x} ,K) %M (N ,K); strictly unless (N ,K) ∈ S P .
ii. (N ,K) %M (N∪{x} ,K∪{x}); strictly unless (N ,K) ∈ S A.
Axiom 3 is the converse of Axiom 2 at the other end of the ranking of
the set N : if a new element is added to the set N which is worse ranked
than every selected element, then the selection becomes more (respectively,
less) orderly if this new element is not selected, Axiom 3.i (respectively, is
selected, Axiom 3.ii).
To see these axioms “in action”, consider the selected set represented
graphically in (1). Axioms 2 and 3 are illustrated by the following changes
in the selected set, where the new element is boxed.
9Note that the statement of Axioms 2 and 3 requires that x can be measured against
the existing elements of N . Thus if N is the set of English test cricketers, x is the record
of a newly eligible player; if N is the set of Italian chemistry professors, x is the citation
count of a newly appointed one.
11
Axiom
new element
in set (1)
selected
Y/N?
New selected set
more/less
orderly?
2.i better than every selected yes 1 011000010001000 more
2.ii better than every selected no 0 0 11000010001000 less
3.ii worse than every selected yes 01100001000100 1 0 less
3.i worse than every selected no 011000010001 0 000 more
In the first and fourth rows the selection becomes more orderly, and in
the second and third less so. In the first two rows the new element can
indifferently be in the first or second position of the ranking; and in the third
and fourth row, in any of the bottom four positions.
The selection (1) is neither perfect nor antiperfect, and so all the
comparisons between it and the selected sets in the above table are strict.
The three axioms are independent: it is possible to define different orderli-
ness relations such that one Axiom is violated but the other two are satisfied.
To see this, consider an orderliness relation, M̂, which, given a selected set
(N ,K) and an element x /∈ N , requires (N ,K) M̂ (N ∪ {x} ,K ∪ {x}) if
there exists z ∈ N\K such that x < z < y for all y ∈ K. In word, in or-
der for a new element to make the selection more orderly, it must be better
than at least one non-selected element in N which is better than all the se-
lected elements. Clearly M̂ violates Axiom 2, and obeys Axioms 1 and 3. A
symmetric argument holds in respect of Axiom 3. Lastly, consider an order-
liness relation, M˜, which, given a selected set (N ,K) and any two elements
x ∈ N\K and y ∈ K, requires (N ,K) M˜ (N ,K ∪ {x} \ {y}) if there exists
z ∈ N , such that x < z < y. That is, in order to make a selection more
orderly, a swap must be between elements which are separated by at least
one element in N . M˜ violates Axiom 1, and obeys Axioms 2 and 3.
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Axioms 2 and 3 dictate the relative orderliness of two selected sets where
the ranked sets, N and N∪{x}, differ in size by 1. The dominance axioms,
labelled by BBP (p 905) the Ga¨rdenfors principle (Ga¨rdenfors 1976), im-
pose an ordering on selections from a given ranked set, therefore they apply
to sets of the same size. We derive them in our framework as immediate
consequences of Axioms 2 and 3 in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 i. For all (N ,K) ∈ S and x ∈ N\K such that x < y for all
y ∈ K, (N ,K∪{x}) %M (N ,K); strictly unless (N ,K) ∈ S A.
ii. for all (N ,K) ∈ S and x ∈ K such that x < y for all y ∈ K\ {x},
(N ,K) %M (N ,K\{x}); strictly unless (N ,K) ∈ S P .
iii. For all (N ,K) ∈ S and x ∈ K such that y < x for all y ∈ K\{x},
(N ,K\{x}) %M (N ,K); strictly unless (N ,K) ∈ S P .
iv. for all (N ,K) ∈ S and x ∈ N\K such that y < x for all y ∈ K,
(N ,K) %M (N ,K∪{x}); strictly unless (N ,K) ∈ S A.
Proof. We only establish the first claim, as the proof of the remainder is
essentially identical. Consider a selected set (N ,K), and an x ∈ N\K such that
x < y for all y ∈ K. Note that this implies that (N ,K) /∈ S P . Take z /∈ N ,
such that z < y for all y ∈ K, and xRz (that is z is better than every selected
element, but worse than x). By Axiom 2.ii, (N ,K) M (N ∪ {z} ,K). Next note
that, by Axiom 3.i, (N ∪ {z} ,K) M (N ∪ {z} \ {x} ,K). Finally, notice that
m (N ∪ {z} \ {x} ,K) = m (N ∪ {x} ,K), since an excluded element better than
all selected elements is replaced by another, and so (N ,K) M (N ∪ {x} ,K).
Intuitively, if a non-selected element that is better ranked than every
selected element were instead selected, the selection would become more or-
derly (Corollary 1.i), and if the best element in the selection were removed,
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the selection would become less orderly (Corollary 1.ii). Conversely, con-
sider an element in N which is worse ranked than every selected element:
if it is removed from the selection, then the selection becomes more orderly
(Corollary 1.iii); if it is added to the selection, then the selection becomes
less orderly (Corollary 1.iv).
While Corollary 1 is an obvious consequence of Axioms 2 and 3, the
next result is less immediate, and shows that, although Axioms 1-3 may
seem weak, they do have some bite, as can be inferred from one of their
implications on the comparison of “extreme” selections from different sized
sets.
Proposition 1 i. Let (Np1 ,Kp1) , (Np2 ,Kp2) ∈ S P . Then (Np1 ,Kp1) ∼M
(Np2 ,Kp2).
ii. Similarly, let (Na1 ,Ka1) , (Na2 ,Ka2) ∈ S A. Then (Na1 ,Ka1) ∼M (Na2 ,Ka2).
iii. Let (N ,K) ∈ S \S P\S A; let (Np,Kp) ∈ S P ; let (Na,Ka) ∈ S A.
Then (Np,Kp) M (N ,K) and (N ,K) M (Na,Ka).
Proof. Let us begin with (i). Consider a perfect selection of Kp elements
from a set (Np,Kp), with (Np,Kp) ∈ S P . Clearly the best ranked Kp elements are
inKp, the rest inNp\Kp. Now add to the set and to the selection an element z1 such
that z1 < x for all x ∈ Kp. By Axiom 2.i, (Np,∪{z1} ,Kp∪{z1}) %M (Np,Kp).
Next return to the selection (Np,Kp), and add, again to the set and to the selection,
an element z2 such that x < z2 for all x ∈ Kp, and z2 < y for all y ∈ Np\Kp (that
is z2 is worse ranked than every selected element, but better ranked than every
non-selected element). By Axiom 3.ii, (Np,Kp) %M (Np,∪{z2} ,Kp∪{z2}). But
now notice that both new selections select only the best ranked Kp + 1 elements:
hence, m (Np,∪{z1} ,Kp∪{z1}) = m (Np,∪{z2} ,Kp∪{z2}). By transitivity, these
both equal m (Np,Kp). The process can be repeated to show that all perfect
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selections are equally orderly. The proof of (ii) is identical. Consider (iii) next.
Take a selection (N ,K) with (N ,K) ∈ S \S P \S A. Let N and K be the number
of elements in N and K. Now let x1 ∈ K be the best ranked selected element
such that there is a non-selected element y ∈ N\K such that y < x1. Because the
selection is not perfect, it is possible to find such a x1. Next let y1 ∈ N\K be the
best ranked non-selected element such that there a selected element x ∈ K such
that y1 < x. Again, because the selection is not antiperfect, it is possible to
find such a y1. Now by Axiom 1, (N ,K∪{x1} \ {y1}) M (N ,K). If the selection
(N ,K∪{x1} \ {y1}) is perfect, then we are done. If not, we can repeat, until
a perfect selection in reached. This happens in at most min {K,N −K} steps,
and establishes that (Np,Kp) M (N ,K). The demonstration that (N ,K) M
(Na,Ka) is identical.
In words, Proposition 1 says that all perfect selections are equally or-
derly, and similarly, that all antiperfect selections are equally orderly.
The third statement asserts that every perfect selection is strictly more
orderly than every non-perfect selection, and every antiperfect selec-
tion is strictly less orderly than every non-antiperfect selection. This is
entirely reasonable when the selection is from the same set. Thus, selecting
the best ten from a set of one hundred elements is clearly more orderly than
selecting the best nine and the eleventh. However, as we want to extend
the range of selected sets to be compared, it is possible to think of extreme
situations when the size of the sets and of the selections is different, and
when the argument that a perfect selection is more orderly is less clear-
cut. Consider, for example, the following case: is selecting the better of the
two elements of a set unquestionably more orderly than selecting the best
25 and the 27-th ranked out of a set with 10,000 elements? Proposition 1
answers unambiguously yes, but someone might argue in favour of the op-
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posite, on the grounds that the former is more likely than the latter to have
been determined by other criteria, which by chance happen to coincide with
the rank, whereas the selection of the first 25 and the 27-th elements out of
a very large set would almost surely be seen as the consequence of a deter-
minate intention to use the rank as the criterion for selection, with the 26-th
element being excluded due to some other criterion.
3 An index of “orderliness”
Definition 3 An index of orderliness is a function M : S −→ [−1, 1] such
that, given any two selected sets (NA,KA) , (NB,KB) ∈ S , (NA,KA) %M
(NB,KB) if and only if M (m (NA,KA)) >M (m (NB,KB)).
Note that we require the index to takes values ranging from −1 to 1, in the
cases of an antiperfect and a perfect selection, respectively. Of course,
a different normalisation would allow us to choose any two end points. How-
ever, in analogy with the measures of correlation, having 1 indicating perfect
orderliness, and −1 its antithesis, where the selection perversely chooses the
worst elements, does seem the natural choice. In analogy with the theory
of consumers’ preferences, existence of the index of orderliness is ensured by
the additional requirement that the orderliness relation is continuous. The
formal proof is identical with the proof of the existence of a utility function;
as with consumer theory, a lexicographic relation illustrates well the need of
continuity to represent orderliness through an index. Consider the following
way of comparing the orderliness of any two selected sets: take first the best
ranked element in each: if only one selection includes it, then that selection
is strictly more orderly than the other. Otherwise, look next at the second
best ranked element, and again, if it is included only in one selection, this is
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the more orderly one. Again, if they are both or neither selected, go to the
next ranked element and so on. If one selection “runs out of elements” before
the other, then it is less orderly. In analogy with consumer preferences, this
relation is reflexive, complete and transitive, but it is not continuous, and so
it cannot be represented by an index of orderliness.10
To ensure existence of a orderliness index representing a relation M, there-
fore we require that the orderliness relation be continuous.11
Uniqueness, on the other hand, is not ensured by the three axioms pro-
posed: it is possible to find pairs of relations both satisfying the three axioms,
which rank differently the orderliness of given selected sets, and therefore are
represented by indices of orderliness which attach differently ordered values
to given selected sets. To see this, consider the following two indices.
M (m (N ,K)) = N + 1−
2
K
∑
x∈K ρN (x)
N −K , (2)
and
M1(m (N ,K)) =
2K2+1
3
+N (N −K + 1)− 2
K
∑
x∈K ρN (x)
2
(N + 1) (N −K) . (3)
10The relation given in the text can be formalised as follows.
Given any two selected sets (NA,KA) , (NB ,KB) ∈ S , take x1 ∈ NA with ρ (x1) = 1 and
y1 ∈ NB with ρ (y1) = 1. If x1 ∈ KA and y1 /∈ KB then (NA,KA) M (NB ,KB), and vice
versa if x1 /∈ KA and y1 ∈ KB then (NB ,KB) M (NA,KA). Otherwise, that is if either
(x1 ∈ KA and y1 ∈ KB) or (x1 /∈ KA and y1 /∈ KB), then take x2 ∈ NA with ρ (x2) = 2
and y2 ∈ NB with ρ (y2) = 2. If x2 ∈ KA and y2 /∈ KB then (NA,KA) M (NB ,KB), and
vice versa if x2 /∈ KA and y2 ∈ KB then (NB ,KB) M (NA,KA).
For i > 2: if (xi ∈ KA and yi ∈ KB) or if (xi /∈ KA and yi /∈ KB), then: if KA = i
and KB = i, then (NB ,KB) ∼M (NA,KA); if KA > i and KB = i, then (NA,KA) M
(NB ,KB), and vice versa if KA = i and KB > i, then (NB ,KB) M (NA,KA); if KA > i
and KB > i, then take xi+1 ∈ NA with ρ (xi+1) = i+1 and yi+1 ∈ NB with ρ (yi+1) = i+1.
If xi+1 ∈ KA and yi+1 /∈ KB then (NA,KA) M (NB ,KB), and vice versa if xi+1 /∈ KA
and yi+1 ∈ KB then (NB ,KB) M (NA,KA).
11That is, the inverse image M of any open subset of S is itself open. Given a set s ⊆ S,
its inverse image is the set M−1 (s) = {s ∈ S|∃s1 ∈ s : sMs1}. Because the cardinality of
the set S is the same as that of the set of real numbers (Lucas 1990, pp 134–135), open
sets in S are those that are put in correspondence with open intervals in R by a surjection.
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For future reference, it is convenient to denote the sum of the ranks of the
selected elements as:
r =
∑
x∈K
ρN (x) . (4)
Using (4), the expression in (2) can then be written as
M(m (N ,K)) = r
N,K + rK − 2r
rN,K − rK ,
where rK and r
N,K are the sum of the ranks when the best and the worst
K elements are selected, respectively, and therefore they are given by: rK =∑K
j=1 j, and r
N,K =
∑N
j=N−K+1 j. Similarly for M1(m (N ,K)): it can be
written as
M1(m (N ,K)) =
rN,K1 + r1,K − 2
∑
x∈K ρN (x)
2
rN,K1 − r1,K
,
where r1,K and r
N,K
1 are the sum of the squares of the ranks when the best and
the worst K elements are selected, r1,K =
∑K
j=1 j
2, and rN,K1 =
∑N
j=N−K+1 j
2.
Proposition 2 A relation represented by the index M(m (N ,K)) satisfies
Axioms 1-3.
Proof. Suppose a relation M on S × S is given, which can be represented by
the index (2), M(m (N ,K)). We begin by showing that M satisfies Axioms 2 and
3. In each of these axioms, a new element z is added to the set N . Therefore N
increases by 1. What happens to K and to the total rank r depends on which part
of which Axiom is considered. In Axiom 2.i the new element z is in the selection,
and so K also increases by 1, and as z is better than every selected element, the
total rank increases by ρN (z) + K: each of the K previously selected elements
increases by 1, and the new element’s rank ρ (z) is added to the total. The value
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of M therefore changes from
N + 1− 2K r
N −K (5)
to
N + 2− 2K+1 (r + ρN (z) +K)
N −K .
The difference is
2 rK − 2ρN (z)−K + 1
(N −K) (K + 1) , (6)
which is increasing in r, and equals 2(N−K)(K+1) > 0 when r takes its lowest possible
value given ρN (z),
∑ρN (z)+K
j=ρN (z)+1
j. Thus it is positive for every feasible value of r.
If the new element is not selected, Axiom 2.ii, then K does not change, but the
total rank of the selected elements increases by K, since the rank of every selected
element increases by 1, and so the value of the index changes from (5) to
N − 2K r
N + 1−K .
The difference with (5) is − 2N−K+1−
2
K
r
(N+1−K)(N−K) which is increasing in r, and since it is
0 at the maximum value of r, rN,K = K(2N−K+1)2 , it is strictly negative for any
other value of r, establishing the result.
Next consider Axiom 3. There is a new element in N which is worse than
all the elements selected. In Axiom 3.i, the new element is not selected, and so
neither K nor r change. In this case, the index (2) becomes
N + 2− 2K r
N + 1−K .
The difference with its previous value, (5), is − K+1−
2
K
r
(N+1−K)(N−K) , which is increasing
in r. Since it is 0 at the minimum value of r, which is rK =
K(K+1)
2 , it is strictly
positive for any other value of r, and so the index increases in this case. Finally
Axiom 3.ii: the new element, worse than all those already selected, is itself selected.
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Table 1: Summary of the proof of Proposition 2.
∀y ∈ K, z /∈ N , zRy ∀y ∈ K, z /∈ N , yRz
Axiom 2.i: z ∈ K.
r increases by ρN (z) +K,
K increases by 1.
The orderliness is higher:
N+2− 2
K+1
(r+ρN (z)+K)
N−K > M (N ,K)
Axiom 3.ii: z ∈ K.
r increases by ρN (z),
K increases by 1.
The orderliness is lower:
N+2− 2
K+1
(r+ρN (z))
N−K < M (N ,K)
Axiom 2.ii: z /∈ K.
r increases by K,
K does not change.
The orderliness is lower:
N− 2
K
r
N+1−K < M (N ,K)
Axiom 3.i: z /∈ K.
r does not change,
K does not change.
The orderliness is higher:
N+2− 2
K
r
N+1−K > M (N ,K)
Thus K increases by 1 and r by ρN (z), and so index (2) becomes
N + 2− 2K+1 (r + ρN (z))
N −K ,
and the difference with (5) is
K+1−ρN (z)+ 2K r
(N−K)(K+1) , increasing in r and taking, for given
ρN (z), its maximum value, 0, at r =
∑ρN (z)−1
j=ρN (z)−K j = K
(
ρN (z)− 1+K2
)
.
Consider finally Axiom 1, which is straightforward: the swap between an ele-
ment in the selection and an element not in the selection changes neither K nor N .
It only changes r, and so clearly the index M increases if r decreases, that is if a
better ranked element takes the place of a worse ranked one in the selection. This
establishes that the index (2) satisfies all the Axioms and completes the proof.
Table 1 summarises the proof of Lemma 2, by presenting a schematic
description of the effects of adding a new element to a selected set, and of
the effects which Axioms 2 and 3 require on the value of the index: in all
cases, N increases by 1, and K, r, and M (N ,K) are the original values of the
size of the selection, of the sum of the ranks, and of the index of orderliness.
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The analogous of Proposition 2 for the index (3) holds, but its proof is
essentially identical to the above proof and is omitted.
Proposition 3 A relation represented by the index M1(m (N ,K)) satisfies
Axioms 1-3.
Now consider the following two selected sets, (NA,KA) and (NB,KB) such
that m (NA,KA) = (11, {2, 3, 5, 8, 9}) and m (NB,KB) = (11, {1, 2, 3, 8, 11}).
Graphically, these differ only in the selection of the elements in the boxes:
(NA,KA) −→ 0 110 1 001 1 0 0 ,
(NB,KB) −→ 1 110 0 001 0 0 1 .
We haveM(m (NA,KA)) < M(m (NB,KB)) andM1(m (NA,KA)) > M1(m (NB,KB)):
if the relation of orderliness is represented by index (2), then the second is
more orderly, and vice versa, if orderliness is described by a relation repre-
sented by index (3) then the first is more orderly. Thus both indices M and
M1 satisfy Axioms 1-3, and yet they give a different answer to the question
of the relative orderliness of the two sets: Axioms 1-3 are not characterising.
The restriction required to ensure characterisation is remarkably simple,
as the rest of the paper shows. We replace Axiom 1 with the following.
Axiom 4 (Mirror invariance) For all (N ,K) ∈ S and x /∈ N , (N ∪
{x} ,K ∪ {x} ) %M (N ,K) if and only if (N ,N\K) %M (N ∪ {x} ,N\K).
In words, suppose that a new element is added to the set N , and that this
makes the new selected set more orderly. Then it must be the case that the
“mirror image” of the new selected set, that is the selection from the same set
which includes all the elements which are not selected in the original selection,
and excludes all those which were included, is less orderly than the mirror
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image of the original selected set. Axiom 4 is stated for the case when the
new element is selected, but it of course implies the opposite case:
(N ∪{x} ,
K) %M (N ,K) if and only if (N ,N\K) %M (N ∪ {x} ,N\K ∪ {x}). Axiom
4 is illustrated below, using the representation of a selected set given above:
(N ,K) −→ 001001010110000000000,
(N ,N\K) −→ 110110101001111111111,
(N∪{x} ,K∪{x}) −→ 0010 1 01010110000000000,
(N∪{x} ,N\K) −→ 1101 0 10101001111111111.
If the first selected set is more orderly than the third, which differ from
the first as it has a new element, ranked 5, which is selected, then it must be
the case that the second is less orderly than the fourth, which is the mirror
image of the third, and vice versa.
We can now establish the main result of the paper.
Theorem 1 A reflexive transitive, complete and continuous orderliness rela-
tion M satisfies Axioms 2-4 if and only if it can be represented by a monotonic
transformation of the index of orderliness M(m (N ,K)), given in (2).
The “if” part of this result follows immediately from Proposition 2: to
see this simply note that Axiom 4 implies Axiom 1. To establish the “only
if” part, suppose that there is an orderliness relation which satisfies Axiom
4, which is represented by an index M which is not a function of the sum of
the ranks of the selected elements. In particular take a set (N ,K) and a new
element x /∈ N , and let the index attached to the set (N ,K) have value M0.
This can be mapped into the index of orderliness (2), so that
M (m (N ,K)) = N + 1−
2
K
r
N −K , (7)
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The “only if” part is based on the following Lemma, which also has
independent interest.
Lemma 1 An index of orderliness represents a relation M satisfying Axiom
4 if and only if it is a decreasing function of the sum of the ranks of the
selected elements.
Proof. Consider a set (N ,K). We show, first, that the index (7), which is
decreasing in the sum of the ranks of the selected elements, does indeed satisfy
Axiom 4, and, second, that an index which satisfies Axiom 4 must be decreasing
in the sum of the ranks of the selected elements.
Starting from the set (N ,K) , suppose that we add a new element x, which
takes rank ρN (x), and with kx selected elements in the “initial” set (N ,K) with
better rank than x. The sum of the ranks of the selected elements in the new set
(N ∪ {x} ,K ∪ {x}) is (r + ρN (x) + (K − kx)), and hence the index of orderliness
of this new set is given by:
M (m (N ∪ {x} ,K ∪ {x})) = N + 2−
2
K+1 (r + ρN (x) +K − kx)
N −K . (8)
Suppose that this new element x makes the selection more orderly, and so the
expression on the RHS of (8) must exceed the corresponding expression in (7):
N + 2− 2K+1 (r + ρ (x) +K − kx)
N −K >
N + 1− 2K r
N −K .
Re-arranging, we can see that the above inequality holds, and therefore that the
index of orderliness increases when the new element x is added to the selected set
and selected, if and only if
r
K
− ρN (x) + kx > K − 1
2
. (9)
Now, for Axiom 4 to hold, we require that the mirror image of the new set is
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less orderly than the mirror image (N ,N\K) of the “initial” set, since the set
(N∪{x} ,K∪{x}) is more orderly than the “initial” set (N ,K).
We therefore proceed to calculate the index of orderliness for the mirror image
of the “initial” set (N ,K), that is for the selected set (N ,N\K). In this set, there
are N elements of which (N −K) are selected. The sum of the selected elements
of (N ,N\K) is given by N(N+1)2 − r, and so we have:
M (m (N ,N\K)) =
N + 1− 2N−K
(
N(N+1)
2 − r
)
K
. (10)
The mirror image of the “new” set (N∪{x} ,K∪{x}), is the set (N ∪ {x} ,N\K).
In this set there are N − ρN (x) + 1 elements with rank worse than x, of which
(K − k) are not selected. Therefore N − ρN (x) + 1 − (K − kx) are selected, in-
creasing the sum of the ranks of the selected elements by this amount. Thus:
M (m (N ∪ {x} ,N\K)) =
N + 2− 2N−K
((
N(N+1)
2 − r
)
+N − ρN (x) + 1− (K − kx)
)
K + 1
. (11)
Axiom 4 requires that the RHS of (10) exceeds the RHS of (11). Simple algebraic
re-arrangement shows that this is the case if and only if condition (9) holds. We
have therefore shown that an orderliness relationship that is represented by the
index (7) satisfies Axiom 4.
Next we show that if an orderliness relationship satisfies Axiom 4, then it must
be decreasing in the sum of the ranks of the selected elements. And thus there is
a monotonic transformation such that it equals index (7).
We proceed from a selected set (N ,K), to which we add a new element x /∈ N ,
which is selected, and then remove a selected element of N , y ∈ K. Thus we start
from set (N ,K) and arrive at a “final” set (N ∪ {x} \ {y} ,K ∪ {x} \ {y}), which
has the same N and the same K. Suppose that this makes the new set more
orderly. We show that the change in the sum of the ranks of the selected elements
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from the “initial” set and the “final” set has the opposite sign of the corresponding
change in their mirror images. Recall that, since this orderliness relation satisfies
Axiom 4, then the mirror image of the “new” set is more orderly than the mirror
image of the original set (N ,N\K), and so the index is monotonic in the sum of the
ranks of the selected elements. Moreover, because it must take values −1 and 1 at
antiperfect and perfect selections respectively, then it must be monotonically
decreasing, and this proves the Lemma.
So to establish the above argument, we compute the sum of the ranks of the
selected elements in these four sets, namely the “initial” set (N ,K), the “final” set
(N ∪ {x} \ {y} ,K ∪ {x} \ {y}), and their respective mirror images, (N ∪ {x} ,N\K)
and (N ∪ {x} \ {y} ,N\K). Begin with a selected set (N ,K) , and let r be the sum
of the ranks of the selected elements. Add x, and the sum of the selected ranks
of the selected elements of this set, (N ∪ {x} ,K ∪ {x}), is r + ρN (x) + (K − kx),
where, as above, kx is the number of selected elements in the “initial” set (N ,K)
with better rank than x. Now remove from this set the element y, which has rank
ρN∪{x} (y) in the set (N ∪ {x} ,K ∪ {x}). The sum of the rank in the set thus
obtained, (N ∪ {x} \ {y} ,K ∪ {x} \ {y}), is
(
r + ρN (x) + (K − kx)
)− ρN∪{x} (y)− (K + 1− ky) , (12)
where ky is the number of selected elements in the “intermediate” set (N ∪ {x} ,K ∪ {x})
with better rank than y.
Now consider the mirror images. For the initial set (N ,N\K), this is (N+1)N2 −
r. The sum of the ranks of the selected elements in the mirror image of the interme-
diate set (N ∪ {x} ,N\K) is, as shown above, (N+1)N2 −r+(N −K − (ρN (x)− 1− kx))
(the initial number of selected elements, minus the number of those which are
better than x: there are (ρN (x)− 1) elements of rank lower than x and kx are se-
lected). Finally, remove y from the mirror image of the intermediate set, to obtain
the mirror image of the final set. The sum of the ranks of the selected elements of
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this set is
(
(N + 1)N
2
− r + (N −K − (ρN (x)− 1− kx))
)
− (N −K − ρN∪{x} (y) + ky) .
(13)
The first brackets contain the sum of the ranks of the selected elements in the
intermediate set. This is changed by the removal of y: we must subtract 1 for
each of those elements that were in the “intermediate” set (N ∪ {x} ,K ∪ {x}),
had worse rank than y, and were not selected: N −K were not selected, and ky
were better than y. So ρN∪{x} (y)− ky were not selected and are better than y.
To establish the Lemma we need to show that if the sum of ranks (12) is lower
than r (the sum of the ranks in the “initial” set (N ,K)), then the sum of the ranks
of (13) is higher than (N+1)N2 − r, the sum of the ranks in the mirror image of the
“initial” set (N ,N\K). That is if
(
r + ρN (x) + (K − kx)
)− ρN∪{x} (y)− (K + 1− ky) < r, (14)
then
(
(N + 1)N
2
− r + (N −K − (ρN (x)− 1− kx))
)
− (N −K − ρN∪{x} (y) + ky) >
(N + 1)N
2
− r. (15)
As required, (14) and (15) are equivalent, and the proof is complete.
This Lemma implies that a change that decreases the sum of the ranks
of the selected elements makes the set more orderly would make the mirror
image of the selected set less orderly, as required by Axiom 4.
We can now prove the main theorem, by showing that every index of
orderliness representing a relation M satisfying Axioms 2 and 3 which is a
decreasing function of the sum of the ranks of the selected elements is a
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strictly monotonic transformation of M(m (N ,K)).
Proof of Theorem 1. Given the ordinal property of the ranking determined
by the index, any strictly decreasing function of the sum of ranks can be mapped
through a monotonic transformation into a decreasing linear function of the sum
of ranks. That is, any index of orderliness which is a function of the sum of the
ranks, r, can be transformed into one that is written as
M(m (N ,K)) = aK,N − bK,Nr.
Moreover Proposition 1 constrains all perfect selections have the same value,
and all antiperfect selections also to have the same value: these values can be
normalised to 1 and −1 respectively . This implies that for every N > 1 and every
K < N , the following must hold
aK,N − bK,NK (K + 1)
2
= 1, (16)
aK,N − bK,NK (2N −K + 1)
2
= −1. (17)
The first condition requires all perfect selections to give value 1 to the index
and the second all antiperfect selections to give value −1. Solving the above in
aK,N and bK,N , we get:
aK,N =
N + 1
N −K , (18)
bK,N =
2
K (N −K) . (19)
Next, we proceed by induction on N . When N = 2, its lowest possible value,
there are two possible selections from the set {1, 2}, K = {1} which has sum of
ranks r = 1 and K = {2} which has sum of ranks r = 2. The former is perfect,
and so we must have a1,2 − b1,2 = 1, and the latter is antiperfect, and so
a1,2 − 2b1,2 = −1. (18) and (19) satisfy these constraints. In addition, (18) and
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(19) must also satisfy Axioms 2 and 3.
• When the selection is K = {1}, adding a new element to N can result in a
selected set with any of the following images: {1, 2} (Axiom 2.i or Axiom 3.i),
{2} (Axiom 2.ii), {1} (Axiom 3.i) and {1, 3} (Axiom 3.ii). Of these {1, 2}
and {1} are perfect, and so it must be a2,3− 3b2,3 = 1 and a1,3− b1,3 = 1:
both of these hold. Conversely, {2} and {1, 3} are not perfect, and so
a1,3 − 2b1,3 ∈ (−1, 1) and a2,3 − 4b2,3 ∈ (−1, 1) which hold.
• Similarly, when the selection is K = {2}, the add operation can result in
any of the following new selected sets: {1, 3} (Axiom 2.i) {2, 3} (again Ax-
iom 2.i and also Axiom 3.ii), {3} (Axiom 2.ii), {2} (Axiom 3.i). Selection
{2, 3} is antiperfect, and so a2,3 − 5b2,3 must equal −1, and selection is
also antiperfect {3}, which requires a1,3 − 3b1,3 = −1. The remaining
selections are not antiperfect, and this requires: a2,3 − 4b2,3 ∈ (−1, 1),
and a1,3 − 2b1,3 ∈ (−1, 1). All these hold when aK,N and bK,N are given by
(18) and (19).
This establishes that the coefficients a and b satisfy (16) and (17) and so are
given by (18) and (19) when N = 2, and establishes the first step of the induction
process. For the second step, assume to have shown that the statement holds for
N − 1, that is:
aK,N−1 =
N
N − 1−K , (20)
bK,N−1 =
2
K (N − 1−K) , (21)
for all K = 1, . . . , N − 2. Recall that rK and rN,K are the lowest and highest
possible values for the sum of ranks r when the set has size N and the selection
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has size K. We must have:
aK−1,N−1 − bK−1,N−1rK−1 = aK,N − bK,NrK
= aK,N − bK,N (rK−1 +K) , (22)
because if the selection is perfect then including a new element both in N and
in K increases the lowest possible sum of the ranks by K. And similarly for the
highest possible sum of ranks:
aK−1,N−1 − bK−1,N−1rN−1,K−1 = aK,N − bK,NrN,K
= aK,N − bK,N
(
rN−1,K−1 +N
)
. (23)
By the induction hypothesis, (20)-(21), we have that
aK−1,N−1 =
N
N −K ,
bK−1,N−1 =
2
(N −K) (K − 1) .
Substitute these into the two above equations, (22) and (23):
N
N −K −
2rK−1
(N −K) (K − 1) = aK,N − bK,N (rK−1 +K) ,
N
N −K −
2rN−1,K−1
(N −K) (K − 1) = aK,N − bK,N
(
rN−1,K−1 +N
)
;
now substitute
rK−1 =
(K − 1) ((K − 1) + 1)
2
=
K (K − 1)
2
,
rN−1,K−1 =
(K − 1) (2 (N − 1)− (K − 1) + 1)
2
=
(2N −K) (K − 1)
2
,
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to get:
N
N −K −
K (K − 1)
(N −K) (K − 1) = aK,N − bK,N
(
K (K − 1)
2
+K
)
,
N
N −K −
(2N −K) (K − 1)
(N −K) (K − 1) = aK,N − bK,N
(
(2N −K) (K − 1)
2
+N
)
.
Finally, solve the above in aK,N and bK,N , to obtain (18) and (19). This establishes
the Theorerm.
Obviously any strictly monotonic transformation of the index (2) would
represent a relation satisfying Axioms 2-4. The functional form in (2), which
is linear in the sum of ranks, has the natural property of being 0, in expecta-
tion, if the selection is completely random: to see this, note that the expected
rank of K random draws is K(N+1)
2
. Substitute this in (2), to obtain 0.
Theorem 1 is the main result of the paper: in words, it shows that the
index of orderliness (2) satisfies the dominance Axioms 2 and 3, and the mir-
ror invariance Axiom 4, and, conversely, that any index which satisfies the
dominance Axioms 2 and 3, and the mirror invariance Axiom 4, is a mono-
tonic transformation of the index of orderliness (2). Only index (2) satisfies
all three axioms, and it is the only one (up to monotonic transformations) to
do so: Axioms 2, 3 and 4 together characterise the index of orderliness (2).
The structure of the proof of Theorem 1 allows to replace the mirror in-
variance Axiom with an equivalent one, which gives a different interpretation
to the restriction imposed on the orderliness relation to obtain characterisa-
tion.
Axiom 5 (Position Irrelevance) For every (N ,K) ∈ S and for ev-
ery y1 ∈ N\K and x1 ∈ K, satisfying ρ (x1) = ρ (y1) + a, and any y2 ∈
N\K∪{x1} and x2 ∈ K∪{y1}, satisfying ρ (x2) = ρ (y2) − a, where a is
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any integer such that ρ (y1) + a, ρ (y2) − a ∈ {1, . . . , N}, then (N ,K) ∼M
(N ,K∪{y1, y2} \ {x1, x2}).
In words, Axiom 5 considers two subsequent “swaps” between a selected
and a non-selected element. The element newly included in the selection and
the one removed differ in rank by a. The second swap turns the intermediate
selection obtained with the first swap into the final one, by selecting an
element not selected and removing another element from the (intermediate)
selection which are −a ranks apart. Thus, for example, if the first swap
selects the (originally non-selected) 12-th ranked element and de-selects the
19-th ranked; their difference in rank is −7. Suppose the second swap selects
the (originally non-selected) 56-th ranked element and de-selects the 49-th
ranked; their difference in rank is 7.12 Then, by Axiom 5, the initial and
the final selection are equally orderly. In shorter, looser words, the effect of
a change in the selection depends only on the extent of the change, not on
whether it affects the upper or the lower tail of the distribution.13 We note
that the relative importance of the position in the ranking is at the core of the
analysis of distance between preferences in Can (2014). It is straightforward
to establish the following.
Corollary 2 A reflexive transitive, complete and continuous orderliness re-
lation M satisfies Axioms 2, 3, and 5 if and only if it can be represented by
a monotonic transformation of the index of orderliness M(m (N ,K)), given
12The element swapped in the second swap need not be different from the elements
swapped in the first.
13A simple example may illustrate this idea: in some sports, a team’s success is deter-
mined by the performance of its best athletes. This is typically the case, for example, in
“Grand Tour” cycling, where a team’s objective is for the team leader to win the race. In
rowing (and in team pursuit cycling), on the other hand, everyone must push at the same
rate, and the team’s result is heavily influenced by the performance of its weakest mem-
bers. Ranking of selections would, in these sports, violate Axiom 5. Conversely, relays in
track and field (especially the 4×400) approximately satisfy Axiom 5.
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in (2).
Proof. This is simply a consequence of Lemma 1 together with the obvious
observation that the sum of the ranks is left unchanged by a swap that satisfies
Axiom 5.
Note that Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 together imply that Axioms 4,
mirror invariance, and Axiom 5, position irrelevance, are equivalent: each
holds for a relation if and only if the other does.
4 The index M and the Kendall-Tau distance
The study of metrics on orders, initiated by Kendall (1938) has developed
a measure of distance between two rankings of the elements of a given set
N , the Kendall-Tau distance (Kemeny 1959), recently extended to choice
functions (Klamler 2008). This is obtained by counting the number of times
the two rankings “switch” two elements x, y ∈ N . That is, if ρ1 and ρ2
are the two rankings, the distance between them is the number of pairs
(x, y) ∈ N ×N such that ρ1 (x) > ρ2 (x) and ρ1 (y) < ρ2 (y). This count can
then be normalised by the maximum possible number of switches.
This idea has been applied to voting mechanism, whereby a ranking is
interpreted as a vote, and the outcome of an election as the aggregation of
the rankings of different voters.14 We view the Kendall-Tau distance from
a different angle: note in the first place that the index of orderliness (2)
applies to a broader range of situations, such as those where the selections
being compared are from different sets. Secondly, the orderliness index (2)
compares selections, rather than rankings, as the Kendall-Tau distance does.
14Young (1995) includes an intuitive introduction; among the many more recent exam-
ples, Davenport and Kalagnanam (2004), or Betzler and Dorn (2010).
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Nevertheless, a selection does rank the elements of a set, albeit in a very
coarse manner: the K selected elements are joint first, and the non-selected
ones are joint (K + 1)-th. Recall that the Kendall-Tau distance is defined
when there are ties, and so we can measure the Kendall-Tau distance between
the ranking determined by a selection and a given ranking ρ of N . In this
section we study the relation between this Kendall-Tau distance and the
index of orderliness (2), M(N ,K).
To develop the formal analysis, given a selected set (N ,K), define a map-
ping κNK : N −→ {1, . . . , N} as follows:
κNK : x 7−→
{
1 if x ∈ K,
K + 1 if x ∈ N\K.
(24)
That is the ordering κNK assigns a better rank to x ∈ N than to y ∈ N
if and only x is selected and y is not. We can label κNK the ordering induced
by the selection K. Since it is an ordering of the set N , we can define the
Kendall-Tau distance between ρ and κNK. To count the number of switches
between rankings ρ and κNK, note that a switch occurs only when the better
element is not selected and the worse one is. The total number of switches
is thus measured by:∣∣κNK (x)− κNK (y)∣∣
2K
(
1− ρ (x)− ρ (y)|ρ (x)− ρ (y)|
κNK (x)− κNK (y)− ε
|κNK (x)− κNK (y)− ε|
)
,
where ε ∈ (0, 1). To see this, note simply that the first term is 1
2
if only one
of x and y is selected, and is 0 otherwise. Consider the second factor: given
that κNK (x) 6= κNK (y), its second term is 1 if ρ and κ agree, and −1 if they
do not, and so the whole term is 2 if a switch occurs. The role of ε is to
ensure that the denominator is never 0. To sum up, the Kendall distance,
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between the ranking of a set N and the ranking induced by the selection K
is given by
τ(N ,K) =
∑
x∈N
∑
y∈N\{x}
∣∣κNK (x)− κNK (y)∣∣
2K
(
1− ρ(x)−ρ(y)|ρ(x)−ρ(y)|
κNK(x)−κNK(y)− 1
2
|κNK(x)−κNK(y)− 12 |
)
.
Next note that the maximum number of switches is (N −K)K, which hap-
pens in an antiperfect selection, where the first N −K elements have K
switches each, and therefore the normalised Kendall-Tau distance is
τˆ(N ,K) = τ(N ,K)
K (N −K) . (25)
One would want that the shorter the distance between the given ranking
in the set N and the ordering induced by the selection K, the more orderly
the selected set (N ,K). The next results shows that this is indeed the case:
it shows that there is a very simple link between the normalised Kendall-Tau
distance (25) and the index of orderliness (2).
Proposition 4 M(m (N ,K)) = 1− 2τˆ(N ,K).
Proof. We proceed by induction on N , the number of elements of N . It is
trivially true for N = 2. In this case, K = 1: when the better (worse) element
is selected M(m (N ,K)) = 1 and τˆ(N ,K) = τ(N ,K) = 0 (M(m (N ,K)) = −1
and τˆ(N ,K) = τ(N ,K) = 1). Next, suppose to have demonstrated the result for
N − 1; let K be the number of selected elements, so we have
M(m (N ,K)) = 1− 2τˆ(N ,K),
and
M(m (N ,K)) = N −
2
K
∑
x∈K ρ (x)
N − 1−K =
K (N − 1−K)− 2τ(N ,K)
K (N − 1−K) , (26)
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which implies: ∑
x∈K
ρ (x)− τ(N ,K) = 1
2
K (K + 1) . (27)
Now increase the number of elements in the set from N−1 to N , which is achieved
via the inclusion in N of a new element, z. Its rank in the new set N∪{z} is ρ (z) ∈
{1, . . . , N}, and z is either selected, giving the new selected set (N ∪ {z} ,K ∪ {z}),
or not selected, giving the set (N ∪ {z} ,K). Consider the first case: the new
number of selected elements is K + 1. In this case note that the total rank of the
selected elements increases by ρ (z) + s, where s is the number of elements in the
set {y ∈ K|ρ (y) > ρ (z)}. The new value of τ , is instead equal to the previous one,
τ(N ,K), increased by the number of new switches generated by z: all the previous
switches remain such of course. This is given simply by the number of elements in
the set {y ∈ N\K|ρ (y) < ρ (z)}, which can be obtained by noting that there are
ρ (z)− 1 elements ranked better than z, and that K − s are selected (because s is
the number of selected elements with rank worse than z). Thus the increase in τ
is (ρ (z)− 1− (K − s)). This gives:
M (m (N ∪ {z} ,K ∪ {z})) = N + 1−
2
K+1
∑
x∈K ρ (x)− (ρ (z) + s)
(K + 1) (N −K − 1)
=
(K + 1) (N −K − 1)− 2τ(N ,K)− 2 (ρ (z)− 1− (K − s))
(K + 1) (N −K − 1) .
Rearrange to obtain (27) again. Suppose instead z is not selected, and the new
set is (N ∪ {z} ,K). The total rank of the selected elements increases only by s,
where again s is the number of elements in the set {y ∈ K|ρ (y) > ρ (z)}. The new
value of τ is instead equal to the previous one, τ(N ,K), increased by the number
of new switches generated by z, which in this case is s, the number of selected
elements with rank worse than z. Hence we can write
M (m (N ∪ {z} ,K)) = N + 1−
2
K
(∑
x∈K ρ (x)− s
)
N −K =
K (N −K)− 2τ(N ,K)− 2s
K (N −K) .
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which again gives (27) and completes the proof.
Thus, in addition to satisfying natural axioms, the index (2) coincides,
in the situations where both can be applied, with an established measure of
distance between rankings. This paper therefore provides a micro-foundation
of the Kendall-Tau distance, which currently lacks one.
The Kendall-Tau distance and the Spearman coefficient of rank corre-
lation give in general different answers to the question of the comparison
between two rankings: this implies that there at least one of the axioms
is violated by the Spearman coefficient of correlation between the original
ranking and the ordering κNK derived in (24). The Spearman coefficient,
originally intended for situations with no ties in either ordering, has been
adapted by Taylor (1964) for the case of ties: the adaptation involves re-
placing the ties with ”fractional ties” and adjust with one correction factor
for each set of tied values, again, in either of the two orderings. Given the
assumption of no ties in the ordering of the set N , and given that there are
only two ranks in (24), and thus exactly two correction factors will be re-
quired, one for K, the other for (N-K) tied elements, the Spearman coefficient
of correlation between the original ranking and the ordering κNK derived in
(24) is given by:
1−
6
N
∑N
i=1
(
ρi (x)− κNK (x)
)2
+ N
2−1−3K(N−K)
2
N2 − 1 . (28)
We now show one example of a violation of one of the Axioms. Consider
a selected set (N ,K) represented by 0101110000000. Applying the above
formula, we find that the Spearman correlation coefficient is 0.3929. Now
consider adding a new element which occupies the seventh place in the new
ranking, hence is worse that all of the selected elements, and is itself selected,
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so the new selected set can be represented by 010111 1 0000000 (the new
element is the one in the box). By Axiom 3.ii, the new set must be less
orderly. However, applying the above formula to the new set gives a higher
value of 0.4154, in violation of Axiom 3.ii. Similar counterexamples can be
found for the other Axioms, except Axiom 1.
Another measure of correlation is the Kappa correlation. This applies
to ranking with very few steps (and coincides with the selection when there
are only two categories). This suggests a direction for future research in this
area, namely the extension of the index of orderliness to situations where the
selection is more nuanced than simply “in” and “out”. An example is a coach
selection of the first team and of the second team for a sport tournament.
5 Example: orderliness in Italian universities
The orderliness index proposed here finds a natural application in the anal-
ysis of promotions in hierarchical organisations, where, at given intervals,
individuals from the pool of potential candidates are assessed and some are
promoted, some are not. The determinants of promotions may be stated
formally or known implicitly: thus for example, academic promotions may
be decided by criteria ranging from scientific productivity, to teaching per-
formance, fund-rising ability, seniority, or age; the relative importance of
performance along the various criteria may of course vary from institution
to institution and from discipline to discipline.
As explained in Checchi et al (2014), academic careers in Italy are firmly
channelled along narrowly defined research fields: every academic is allocated
to one and only one of 371 scientific sectors (SSDs), changing sector is rel-
atively unusual, and the members of the promotion panels in each scientific
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Figure 1: Orderliness of scientific sectors by productivity and by age - 1995-2011.
sector are chosen exclusively among academic post holders in that sector.
The dataset assembled by Checchi et al (2014) allows us to rank all the
candidates for promotion to associate professor in each scientific sector in the
period from 1995 to 2011 according to two criteria, their record of publication
in international journals15 and their age.
Since with minor exceptions, each panel could select for promotion only
candidates from the lower rank within the same sector, it is a simple matter
to calculate the orderliness of the selections made by the promotion panel in
each scientific sector, in each of the four separate sub-periods which Checchi
et al (2014) suggest to aggregate calendar years to reflect the pattern of the
15Details are again in Checchi et al (2014): from the Thomson Reuters Web of Knowl-
edge dataset, we construct for each candidate a score given by a combination of research
output and impact: the former measured by the number of publications, and the latter
by the individual h-index.
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promotion rounds.
Figure 1 describes the outcome of this process. Each dot corresponds to
one of 371 scientific sectors, except the smaller ones, in one 4-year interval.
The abscissa of a dot is the orderliness according to scientific productivity, its
ordinate the orderliness according to age.16 Broad scientific areas are colour
coded; we have also singled out economics and econometrics among the social
science sectors. An analysis of the Italian university sector might use these
indices as characteristics of the selection procedures used in promotion and
appointments. A cursory visual analysis suggests that overall productivity
matters more than age, and also that it matters more in STEM subjects.
6 Concluding remarks
Often an agent chooses a number of options from a larger set, the elements
of which can be ranked in some objective or generally accepted manner.
We propose a way to assess how close this agent’s selection is to the order
of the set. Aside from its intrinsic interest in the examples given in the
introduction, availability of this measure might address the need reported in
the medical literature for an objective evaluation of clinical services (Iverson
1998, Bickman 2012), or help the study of aspects of social mobility, such
as the importance of a person’s family position in her access to leadership
positions in society.17 In this paper, we require that the comparison between
16Occasionally, the rankings we constructed in this way display ties. The analysis of
this paper applies to antisymmetric relations on the set N , and thus it excludes ties at the
outset. To break the ties in the construction of the orderliness index displayed in Figure
1, we have followed a randomisation approach, by bootstrapping the orderliness index (2)
over many repetitions of the procedure, whenever a scientific sector’s ranking has ties.
17Orderliness is at the basis of the popular book and film Moneyball (Lewis 2004),
which tell the story of a baseball team with relatively scarce financial resources which was
able systematically to outperform its much wealthier rivals by basing all its selections on
the players’ ranks; Hakes and Sauer (2006) confirm econometrically the book’s intuition.
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selections satisfies some natural dominance requirements (Axioms 2 and 3),
and the requirement that the mirror image of a change that nears a selection
to the ranking must push the mirror image of that selection away from the
ranking (Axiom 4). These three simple axioms prove very strong, in that
they identify a unique index which provides an unambiguous comparison of
the relative closeness of any selection to the order of the set from which it
is taken. This index has a very simple expression, which depends only on
the sum of the ranks of the selected elements, and the number of elements in
the set and in the selection. The paper ends with a specific example of the
potential applications of our index to the Italian university system.
References
Anderson, C., and D. Sally (2013): The Numbers Game: Why Everything
You Know About Football is Wrong. Penguin Books, London.
Barbera`, S., W. Bossert, and P. K. Pattanaik (2004): “Ranking Sets of
Objects,” in Handbook of Utility Theory, ed. by S. Barbera`, P. J. Hammond,
and C. Seidl, pp. 893–977. Springer, US.
Betzler, N., and B. Dorn (2010): “Towards a Dichotomy for the Possible
Winner Problem in Elections Based on Scoring Rules,” Journal of Computer
and System Sciences, 76, 812–836.
Bickman, L. (2012): “Why Can’t Mental Health Services be More Like Mod-
ern Baseball?,” Administration and Policy in Mental Health and Mental Health
Services Research, 39, 1–2.
Similarly, “artists and repertoire” talent spotters are being replaced in the music industry
by detailed analyses of big data harvested from social media (Mukerji 2015). Anderson
and Sally (2013) argue that the nature of the sport makes the method less applicable to
soccer.
40
Cabizza, M. M., and G. De Fraja (1998): “Quality Considerations in Auctions
for Television Franchises,” Information Economics and Policy, Special Issue on
Media and Multimedia Economics, 10, 9–22.
Can, B. (2014): “Weighted Distances between Preferences,” Journal of Mathe-
matical Economics, 51, 109–115.
Checchi, D., G. De Fraja, and S. Verzillo (2014): “Publish or Perish? An
Analysis of the Academic Job Market in Italy, 1991-2012,” Discussion Paper
10084, CEPR Discussion Paper, London.
Cowell, F. A., and K. Kuga (1981): “Inequality Measurement: An Axiomatic
Approach,” European Economic Review, 15, 287–305.
Dalton, H. (1920): “The Measurement of the Inequality of Incomes,” Economic
Journal, 30, 348–461.
Davenport, A., and J. Kalagnanam (2004): A Computational Study of the
Kemeny Rule for Preference Aggregation. Proceedings of the 19th National Con-
ference on Artifical Intelligence, San Jose, California.
Ga¨rdenfors, P. (1976): “Manipulation of Social Choice Functions,” Journal of
Economic Theory, 13, 217–228.
Hakes, J. K., and R. D. Sauer (2006): “An Economic Evaluation of the Mon-
eyball Hypothesis,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20/3, 173–185.
Iverson, D. J. (1998): “Meritocracy in Graduate Medical Education? Some
Suggestions for Creating a Report Card,” Academic Medicine, 73, 1223–1225.
Kemeny, J. G. (1959): “Mathematics without Numbers,” Daedalus, 88, 577–591.
Kendall, M. G. (1938): “A New Measure of Rank Correlation,” Biometrika, 30,
81–93.
41
Klamler, C. (2008): “A Distance Measure for Choice Functions,” Social Choice
and Welfare, 30, 419–425.
Lewis, M. (2004): Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game. Norton,
New York.
Lucas, J. F. (1990): Introduction to Abstract Mathematics, Second Edition. Ard-
sley House, Lanham MD.
Mukerji, P. (2015): “Moneyballing Music,” MusicTank Publishing, University
of Westminster.
Rubinstein, A., and Y. Salant (2006): “A Model of Choice from Lists,” The-
oretical Economics, 1, 3–17.
Taylor, W. L. (1964): “Correcting the Average Rank Correlation Coefficient for
Ties in Rankings,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 59, 872–876.
Sen, A. (1976): “Poverty: An Ordinal Approach to Measurement,” Econometrica,
44, 219–231.
Young, P. (1995): “Optimal Voting Rules,” Journal of Economic Perspectives,
9, 51–64.
42
